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UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA: TWO COMMENTS ON B.M.P. GLOBAL
DISTRIBUTION INC. v. BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA*
MISTAKE, FORGED CHEQUES AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT:
THREE CHEERS FOR B.M.P. GLOBAL
1. Introduction
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in B.M.P.
Global Distribution Inc. v. Bank of Nova Scotiat is arguably one of the
most important restitution decisions to come down from the court in
recent years. The case concerned the recovery of moneys paid under a
mistake of fact and thus deals with one of the central issues of the law
of restitution. importantly, the decision authoritatively confirms that
the Canadian law of mistaken payments has been restated and
modernized in alignment with the analysis provided by Goff J. in
Barclay's Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd.2 The
particular fact situation in which the mistaken payments rule was
applied dealt with a payment by a drawee bank on a cheque that
contained, in an undiscovered fraud, a forged signature of the drawer.
This is one of the more interesting problems in the law of mistaken
payments and has been the subject of conflicting signals in prior
English and Canadian mistaken payments law. In Global, the court
offers a clear and elegant analysis of this problem and holds that, in
such circumstances, the drawee bank is entitled to recover the moneys
mistakenly paid, either from the collecting bank or the payee,
provided that, in each case, the recipient is not a holder in due course
* Following the release earlier in 2009 of the Supreme Court's decision in this
unjust enrichment case, we received the following two unsolicited comments by
Professor John McCamus and Professor Mitchell Mclnnes. We decided to
publish both comments, not only because of the eminence of the authors as
restitution scholars but also because they entertain fundamentally different views
about how unjust enrichment cases should be decided by the Supreme Court.
Readers' comments on this controversy, not to exceed five hundred words, will be
welcome and should be e-mailed to j.ziegel@utoronto.ca (ed.).
I. (2009), 304 D.L.R. (4th) 292, 386 N.R. 296 (S.C.C.) (Global).
2. [1980] Q.B. 677.
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and has not suffered a detrimental change of position in reliance on
the receipt of the payment.
Perhaps the most important contribution of this decision,
however, is at the level of general principle. The nature of the
relationship between the underlying unjust enrichment principle and
the enormous body of existing restitutionary law has become
somewhat destabilized in recent years as a result of the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Garland v. Consumers Gas Co.3 and
the interpretation placed thereon by some scholars. Essentially, the
controversy concerning the significance of Garland rests on whether
the Garland analysis of the unjust enrichment principle should be
considered to be a doctrine or rule of law that has overruled and
replaced all prior restitutionary law or, alternatively, should be
considered to have the more traditional role of providing a principled
basis for supplementing the existing law by filling in gaps, extending
doctrines in new directions, and modifying prior law in light of its
inconsistency with the general unjust enrichment analysis. The
decision in Global is consistent with what I consider to be the correct
interpretation of Canadian law- that it is this more traditional role
for the unjust enrichment analysis that is envisaged by the Garland
decision. I shall deal with each of these three topics -mistake, forged
cheques and unjust enrichment - in turn.
The facts underlying the dispute in Globalare striking. Mr. Hashka
and Mr. Backman were the principals of B.M.P. Global Distribution
Inc. (BMP), a company engaged in the business of distributing non-
stick bakeware in British Columbia. Having met and been impressed
by a Mr. Newman of Sunrise Marketing on a trip to the United States,
they raised with Newman the possibility that he might become the
distributor of the product in question in the United States. When
Newman later contacted the two in Vancouver, Hashka suggested a
price for the distribution rights in the United States of US$1.2 million
by, it was conceded, "pulling the number out of the air".4 Sometime
later, Hashka and Backman received a cheque payable to BMP for Cdn
$904,563 drawn on the account of a corporation named First
National Financial Corporation at a Toronto branch of the Royal
Bank of Canada (RBC). The cheque arrived without a cover letter in an
envelope indicating the sender to be one E. Smith of Mississauga,
Ontario.
Although Hashka and Backman may have initially assumed that
there was some connection between the cheque and their dealings
3. (2004), 237 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629.
4. Supra, footnote 1, at para. 2.
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with Mr. Newman, it was accepted at trial that neither the drawer of
the cheque nor the sender were known to either Hashka or Backman
nor were either of them apparently linked to Newman. Later the same
day, without making any attempt to contact either Smith or First
National, Hashka took the cheque to the Burnaby branch of the Bank
of Nova Scotia (BNs), at which he and Backman conducted their own
banking and the banking related to the affairs of BMP. Hashka
deposited the cheque in the BMP account at the Burnaby branch. Prior
to the deposit, the current balance of the account was $59.67.
Understandably, BNS did not provide immediate access to the
$904,563. The branch manager advised Hashka and Backman that
BNS would not release the funds to them until it was satisfied that the
cheque was authentic. As collecting bank, BNS forwarded the cheque
to RBC. In a week or so, BNs received the funds from RBC and deposited
them in the BMP account.
Over the next ten days, BMP engaged in a "flurry of transactions"
5
that had the effect of dispersing the funds to a variety of accounts,
most of them being accounts at BNS that were related in some way to
the business of BMP or to Hashka and Backman themselves. Modest
amounts were spent by Hashka and Backman on certain expenses.
Some of the transactions might have raised a judicial eyebrow. A
transfer from the BMP account of US$20,000 to a Citibank account in
New York City was made. Haskha and Backman claimed that they
did not know who the holder of the account was nor did they explain
the nature or purpose of the transfer. A second transaction,
suggesting, perhaps, a rather naYve understanding of the law of
tracing, involved the issuance of a certified cheque for $300,000
drawn by BMP on its BNS account to the order Of BMP and subsequently
deposited in an account with the Bank of Montreal. A few days later,
a bank draft issued by BMO for $300,100 was deposited by BMP in its
account at BNS. Hashka and Backman provided no explanation for
this somewhat unusual transaction.
A week after this latter transaction, RBC notified BNS that the
original cheque for US$904,563 was forged. RBC asked for the
assistance of BNS in attempting to retrieve the funds. BMP took the
position, accepted by the courts below, that it was innocent of the
fraud. Accordingly, in its view, it was entitled to retain the moneys
remaining in the various accounts held at BNS. By this point in time,
the total of the funds remaining in these accounts was $776,650.48.
The legal issues relating to the ability of RBC, as a drawee bank that
5. Ibid., at para. 4.
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had mistakenly paid out on a forged cheque, to recover the moneys
paid were thereby engaged.
Matters did not end there. In response to BMP'S insistence that it
was entitled to retain the amounts advanced, BNS then purported to
restrain the amounts remaining in the BMP and related BNS accounts.
Three weeks or so later, RBC and BNS entered into an agreement
pursuant to which RBC warranted that the cheque in question was a
forgery and that the proceeds deposited in BMP'S account at BNS were
the proceeds of fraud. Further, BNS agreed to transfer to RBC the
restrained funds in return for an undertaking by RBC that it would
indemnify BNS for any losses it suffered as a result of the restraint and
transfer of the funds. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, BNS
transferred $777,336.04 to RBC.
In due course, BMP and the holders of the related accounts,
including Hashka and Backman, brought a claim against BNS for
damages including both the value of the restrained amounts and
various items of non-pecuniary loss including aggravated and
punitive damages. BNS defended the claim on the basis that BMP had
never had an interest in the funds since they represented the proceeds
of a forged cheque and, accordingly, that none of the plaintiffs were
entitled to damages of any kind. When the matter ultimately surfaced
before the Supreme Court of Canada, however, the court was of the
view that the critical question to be decided was whether RBC had a
right, at common law, to recover moneys mistakenly paid out on a
forged cheque, either from BNS, the collecting bank, or from the
ultimate payee, BMP. In this rather roundabout way, then, the current
position of Canadian law on this important point surfaced for the
court's consideration.
2. The Basic Mistaken Payments Rule
One of the important contributions made by the decision in Global
is that it provides authoritative confirmation from our highest court
that the basic rule relating to the recovery of mistaken payments has
been restated for purposes of Canadian common law in the form of
the rule articulated by Goff J. in Barclay's Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Simms
Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd.6 It is not surprising that the co-author
of the leading English text on restitution 7 would make many valuable
contributions to the law of restitution at the various stages of his
illustrious judicial career. Goff J.'s modernization of the law of
6. Supra, footnote 2.
7. Lord Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 7th ed. (London, Sweet &
Maxwell, 2007).
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mistaken payments in the Simmscase is not the least of these. Prior to
Goff J.'s elegant restatement of the traditional test, the then existing
English and Canadian law of mistaken payments was both
cumbersome and incoherent. The leading and much-quoted
Canadian statement of the traditional rule was provided by Dysart
J. in R. v. Royal Bank of Canada,8 in which it was stated that a
mistaken payment could be recovered by the payer from the payee
provided that the following four conditions of relief were met:
(1) The mistake must be honest;
(2) The mistake must be as between the person paying and the
person receiving the money;
(3) The facts, as they are believed to be, must impose an
obligation to make the payment; and
(4) The receiver of the money must have no legal or equitable or
moral right to retain the moneys as against the payer.
9
The problems with this traditional rule have been identified by
many observers' and need only a brief summary here. The first
element of the traditional test is unproblematic and signals that the
payer may recover a mistaken payment, provided that he has acted
honestly. Thus, carelessness in the making of the payment will not
preclude relief. It is widely accepted, however, that the second
element in the test is incoherent. It is not clear what is signified by the
requirement that the mistake be "between the parties" and the
requirement is, in any event, one which is ignored in a number of
leading cases. Nonetheless, the existence of the requirement within
the traditional rule has continued to bedevil analysis in more modern
authorities. 1 The third requirement appears to be the accidental by-
product of a dictum in a leading case' 2 and has the unfortunate
consequence that, when applied strictly, recovery is allowed only in
cases where the mistake concerns a fact which, if true, would impose a
liability to make the payment in the question. The requirement thus
precludes recovery in the context, for example, of mistaken gifts.
Nonetheless, as GoffJ. pointed out in Barclay's Bank, it is possible to
imagine many different situations in which the merits of allowing
8. [1931] 2 D.L.R. 685 (Man. K.B.).
9. Ibid., at pp. 688-89.
10. See, e.g., P.D. Maddaugh and J.D. McCamus, The Lawit of Restitution, looseleaf
ed. (Aurora, Canada Law Book Inc.), §10:300.
11. See, e.g., Royal Bank of Canada v. Boyce (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 683, [1966] 2
O.R. 607 (Co. Ct.). For a discussion of which, see Maddaugh and McCamus,
ibid.. §10:300.20.
12. Kelly v. Solari (1841), 9 M. & W. 54, 152 E.R. 24.
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recovery of mistakenly-made gratuitous payments are undeniable. 13
The sentiment expressed in the fourth requirement is not
problematic but, under the traditional doctrine, the central defence
available to the payee would be the traditional doctrine of estoppel, a
doctrine which is ill-suited to providing appropriate protection to a
payee who had, in reliance on the receipt, engaged in a detrimental
change of position. There are two problems with estoppel as a
defence. First, it is normally considered to be available only in
circumstances where the payer had actually made an explicit, but
mistaken, representation to the payee that the payment was due.
14
The mere making of a mistaken payment would not suffice. Further,
ifestoppel as a defence was available to the payee, it could provide too
much protection, as it constitutes an absolute bar to recovery in cases
where the payee's detrimental reliance consumed only a portion of the
mistaken payment.
As Goff J. (and many before him) observed in his opinion in
Barclay's Bank, the key element in a modern reformulation of the
basic mistaken payments rule was the recognition of a more
satisfactory defence to recognize and protect the payee's legitimate
interest in retaining the payment to the extent that the payment had
induced detrimental reliance on the part of the payee. This, of course,
is the modern defence of change of position. Once such a defence is
recognized, as Goff J. proposed in Barclay's Bank, it becomes
possible to generalize the grounds for relief and jettison the second
and third requirements of the traditional test.
In order for Goff J. to accomplish this modernization in his
Barclay's Bank opinion, he engaged in a masterly survey of the
leading cases (by which he was bound) and demonstrated that in none
of them was there a clear ratio decidendi which required that a
mistake, to be operative, must either be "between the parties" or be a
mistake with respect to a fact which, if true, imposed a liability to
make the payment. Concluding his survey and careful reading of the
earlier authorities, Goff J. summarized his analysis as follows:
From this formidable line of authority certain simple principles can, in my
judgment, be deduced: (1) If a person pays money to another under a mistake
of fact which causes him to make the payment, he is prima facie entitled to
recover it as money paid under a mistake of fact. (2) His claim may however
fail if (a) the payer intends that the payee shall have the money at all events,
whether the fact be true or false, or is deemed in law so to intend; or (b) the
payment is made for good consideration, in particular if the money is paid to
discharge, and does discharge, a debt owed to the payee (or a principal on
13. Supra, footnote 2, at p. 697.
14. See, e.g., R.E. Jones Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow Ltd., [1926] A.C. 670 (H.L.).
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whose behalf he is authorized to receive the payment) by the payer or by a
third party to whom he is authorized to discharge the debt; or (c) the payee
has changed his position in good faith, or is deemed in law to have done so.'
5
In short, where moneys have been paid by mistake, they are prima
facie recoverable by the payer if the mistake caused the payment
(whether or not the mistake may be said to be a careless one on the
part of the payer) unless the payee can establish (a) that the mistake
was irrelevant to the making of the payment in the sense that the payer
intended the payee to have the moneys in any event (i.e., regardless of
the possibility of mistake), (b) the payment was required by a
contractual relationship (unless, of course, it can be demonstrated
that the contractual relationship is unenforceable), or (c) the payee
can establish a change of position defence. This restatement of the
law, commonly referred to now as the "Simmns test", marks a very
considerable advance in terms of elegance, coherence, simplicity and
ease of application over the traditional rule.
In Global, Deschamps J. plainly asserted on behalf of the court that
the Simnms test is to be accepted as having replaced the traditional test
set forth in R. v. Royal Bank of Canada. This will not come as an
enormous surprise to those familiar with this subject. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Canada had anticipated developments in English
law by plainly recognizing the existence of the change of position
defence in 1976,16 thus preparing the ground for a modernization of
the basic mistaken payments rule. Moreover, the Simms test had been
referred to favourably in a number of Canadian authorities. 17
Nonetheless, a clear and authoritative recognition of the authority of
the Simmns test, for purposes of Canadian law, is a most welcome and
valuable clarification of this aspect of the Canadian law of restitution.
Turning, then, to the dispute in Global itself, Deschamps J.
considered that the question of whether RBC was entitled to recover
the moneys it had mistakenly paid on the forged cheque was
recoverable, either from BNS or BMP, was to be determined by
application of the Sinms test to the rather remarkable facts of the
Global scenario.
15. Supra, footnote 2, at p. 695. These principles are now commonly referred to as
Proposition I, Proposition 2(a), Proposition 2(b) and Proposition 2(c).
16. Storthoaks (Rural Municipality) v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d)
1, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 147.
17. See, e.g., A.E. LePage Real Estate Services Ltd. v. Rattray Publications (1994),
120 D.L.R. (4th) 499, 21 O.R. (3d) 164 (C.A.) and Central Guaranty Trust Co. v.




3. Applying the Rule to Mistaken Payments by the
Drawee of a Forged Cheque
The application of the Simms test to moneys paid by a drawee bank
upon a forged cheque will be of particular interest to banking and
commercial lawyers. Prior to the decision in Global, it was widely
believed that a drawee who paid over an undiscovered forged
drawer's signature would have considerable difficulty in mounting a
claim for the moneys thus mistakenly paid either against the payee or,
as in Global itself, against a collecting bank who had received funds
from the drawee bank and passed them on to its customer (whether
the customer was a payee or endorsee of the instrument). The
difficulty confronted by the drawee in such circumstances was
attributed to the venerable decision in Price v. Neal. 18 In that case, the
plaintiff, as drawee, had paid out on bills that had been forged and
then endorsed by the forger to the defendant endorsee. The endorsee
had no knowledge of the forgery. The plaintiff paid the first bill and
accepted the second, paying the latter upon presentment. Once the
forgeries were discovered, the plaintiff sought recovery on both
instruments. Lord Mansfield denied both claims.
The proper explanation for the result in Price v. Neal, however, has
remained obscure over the more than two centuries that have assed
since the decision. In a well known article on the subject,' Dean
Ames articulated various explanations for the rule. First, the results
have been explained on the basis that the drawee is precluded from
recovery because of his supposed negligence, this explanation resting
on an assumption that the drawee ought to know the signature of the
drawer. A second explanation rests on a similarly unrealistic
assumption that the banker should be conclusively presumed to be
estopped from asserting the existence of the forgery on the basis that
payment on the instrument constitutes an at least tacit representation
that the signature is genuine. Having discussed these explanations,
Ames went on to identify what he considered to be the true
explanation for the rule as follows:
The true principle [is however that] ... as between two persons having equal
equities, one of whom must suffer the legal title shall prevail. The holder of
the bill of exchange paid away his money when he bought it; the drawee
parted with his money when he took up the bill. Each paid in the belief that
the bill was genuine. In point of natural justice they are equally meritorious.
But the holder has the legal title to the money. A court of equity ... cannot
properly interfere to compel the holder to surrender his legal advantage.
2 0
18. Price v. Neal (1762), 3 Burr. 1355, 97 E.R. 871.
19. J.B. Ames, "The Doctrine of Price v. Neal" (1891), 4 Harv. L. Rev. 297.
20. Ibid., at pp. 298-99.
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We may note, in passing, that Ames assumed that the holder of the bill
has given value for the bill, a fact which is, of course, notably absent in
the Global scenario.
Others have drawn from Price v. Neal support for a broader
proposition to the effect that a policy favouring "finality of payment"
(which, broadly speaking, favours treating negotiable instruments as
equivalent to cash, where possible) would deny relief of moneys
mistakenly paid by banks on forged instruments on the theory that
the payer bank "is the best risk-bearer among the parties involved". 2'
For a Canadian lawyer, the difficulties confronted by the drawee in
a forged cheque case appeared to be compounded by the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Bank of Montreal.22 The
plaintiff bank, as the government's banker, had paid out on a series of
cheques forged by a public servant. The plaintiff's claims against the
collecting banks to whom the various payees had presented their
cheques did not enjoy success. Again, however, the rationale for the
decision is not entirely clear. In particular, the court did not offer an
authoritative view of the proper explanation for the holding in Price
v. Neal. The majority of the five-member panel, however, can be read
as supporting the view that it was the detrimental reliance of the
collecting banks on the payments by the payee in subsequently paying
out on the cheques that precluded the drawee bank from recovery.
In Global, then, the court was confronted directly with a fact
situation in which arguably no detrimental reliance had been suffered
either by BMP itself or by BNS - at least with respect to the funds still
under the control of BNS. In an analytically clear and persuasive
opinion for the court, Deschamps J. held that on the very particular
facts of the Global scenario, neither Price v. Neal nor R. v. Bank of
Montreal precluded application of the Simms test so as to recognize
the ability Of RBC to recover, at common law, the moneys paid out on
the forged cheque, either from BNS or from BMP itself. Given the
variety of possible interpretations of Price v. Neal, Deschamps J. did
"not accept that it provides a basis for an unqualified rule that a
drawee will never have any recourse against either the collecting bank
or the payee where payment has been made on the forged signature of
the drawer". 23 R. v. Bank of Montreal is properly to be explained, in
the court's view, as resting on the existence of detrimental reliance by
the defendant recipient of the funds. Applying the Simms test, then,
21. B. Geva, "Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act - Some
Doctrinal Aspects" (1981-82), 6 C.B.L.J. 269 at p. 313.
22. (1907), 38 S.C.R. 258.
23. Supra, footnote I, at para. 31.
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the plaintiff's mistake had caused the payment. A primafacie right to
recover was therefore established under Proposition 1. Applying
Proposition 2(a), there was no basis for finding or deeming an
intention on the part of RBC to make the payment regardless of any
potential forgery. Applying Proposition 2(b), BMP had given no
consideration for the payment. Applying Proposition 2(c), no change
of position had occurred. Accordingly, RBC could establish a sound
claim to recover the moneys paid at common law.
It will be useful to explicate certain aspects of the court's
application of the Simms test in greater detail. In considering
Proposition 2(a) - i.e., the requirement that the payer not have
intended that the payee keep the money in all events (or be deemed to
have done so)- Deschamps J. considered this the appropriate rubric
within which to consider whether the payer bank ought to be required
to absorb the loss on policy grounds relating to the concept of
"finality of payment". In other words, in the interest of supporting the
policy that negotiable instruments should be considered, to the extent
possible, as equivalent to cash, one might deem the bank to have
intended to pay regardless of whether the cheque was forged or not.24
Although the principle of "finality of payment" was said by
Deschamps J. to underlie both the common law rules and pertinent
provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act, this general goal "as laudable
as it is... does not negate rights that may otherwise accrue to a party.
It cannot be raised by a payee as an indiscriminate bar to the recovery
of a mistaken payment .2 ' On this point, Deschamps J. found helpful
the following observation of Stephen Scott, made in the pages of this
journal:
[N]o very convincing reason can be offered for refusing the drawee relief in
the single instance where the mistake involves acceptance or payment on a
forged drawer's signature, whilst relief is freely given to the drawee on all
other acceptances or payments by a mistake (including indeed various other
kinds of forgeries; even the case where the drawer's own endorsement is
forged on a bill payable to his order) (s. 129(b)).26
Further, one might add on the Globalfacts, no very convincing reason
24. Although, in my view, it is quite appropriate to consider whether this policy
consideration should preclude recovery, it does not seem necessary to go through
the somewhat artificial exercise of characterizing this as a basis for a deemed
intention to pay in any event. Policy considerations arising from the legal nature
of negotiable instruments are surely relevant to the disposition of the claim
without such a characterization.
25. Supra, footnote 1, at para. 35.
26. S.A. Scott, "Comment on Benjamin Geva's paper: 'Reflections on the Need to
Revise the Bills of Exchange Act - Some Doctrinal Aspects"' (1981-82), 6
C.B.L.J. 331 at p. 342. The pertinent provision of the Bills of Exchange Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4 is now numbered 128(b).
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can be offered for allowing BMP or its principals to retain the fruits of
the fraud perpetrated by the forger. It is difficult to imagine a more
uncongenial fact situation in which to test out the merits of a broader
"finality of payment" rationale. One would need a particularly
devoted faith in the importance of treating negotiable instruments as
equivalent to cash in order to justify what many would instinctively
consider to be the rather substantial unjust enrichment of BMP and its
principals on the present facts.
In order to reach this conclusion, Deschamps J. needed to
circumvent some potential difficulties, which require only brief
mention for present purposes. First, BMP sought to rely on the
combined effect of ss. 128 and 165 of the Bills of Exchange Act27 in
support of the proposition that BNS was a holder in due course of the
forged instruments and, accordingly, was not vulnerable to a claim by
RBC. Section 128(a) provides as follows:
128. The acceptor of a bill by accepting it is precluded from denying to a
holder in due course
(a) the existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature and his
capacity and authority to draw the bill; (emphasis added)
Section 165(3) provides the following:
(3) where a cheque is delivered to a bank for deposit to the credit of a
person and the bank credits him with the amount of the cheque, the bank
acquires all of the rights and powers of the holder in due course of his
cheque.
As Deschamps J. noted, these provisions do have the consequence
that BNS would be entitled, in defence of a claim brought by RBC to
recover the moneys paid by mistake, to raise the defence that it is, by
statute, constituted as a holder in due course. BNS would thus be in a
position to successfully defend the claim. For Deschamps J.,
however, the fact that BNS would be entitled to do so did not mean
that it was required to do so. It was open to BNS to refrain from taking
advantage of its statutory entitlement. Accordingly, the decision
made by BNS to restore the moneys to RBC does not conflict with its
status as a holder in due course. Further, the fact that BNS could have
relied on its statutory holder in due course status was of no assistance
to BMP. As far as the position of BMP itself as a holder of the instrument
was concerned, the fact that it had not given value for the instrument
precluded it from acquiring the status of a holder in due course.
Accordingly, it could not raise a defence under s. 128.
BMP had also placed reliance on the provisions of its contractual




explicitly permit BNS to restrain the funds in these circumstances and
restore them to RBC. Deschamps J. dismissed this argument on the
basis that s. 17(3) of that agreement specifically retained the banker's
rights at common law with respect to "loans, set-offs, deposits and
banking matters" even if such rights are not described in the
agreement. 28 On this basis, Deschamps J. held that the agreement did
not preclude the application of the common law in circumstances
where a payment has been made under a mistake of fact. Finally, BMP
argued that the clearing rules constituted an obstacle to recovery.
This argument was rejected on the basis that the clearing rules operate
at the level of banking and similar institutions and have no impact on
the private law rights inherent in the banker/customer relationship or
the remedies available to the parties to such relationships. On the
basis of the foregoing analysis, then, Deschamps J. concluded that
there was no basis for a holding, under the Simms test, that RBC
intended, or is deemed in law to have intended, that BMP receive the
funds in any event.
Deschamps J. then turned to consider Propositions 2(b) and 2(c) of
the Simms test - whether consideration was given by BMP and
whether a change in position had occurred. As noted above, it is plain
that BMP gave no value for the instrument. With respect to change of
position, however, the point is slightly more difficult, as it is the case
that BNS, as collecting bank, had received the funds for the benefit of
BMP and credited them to BMP'S account. For Deschamps J., however,
this did not constitute a true change of position because to the extent
that the funds remained in BMP'S account or related accounts with
BNS, BNS remained the holder of the funds. The role of BNS had been
transformed from that of a collecting bank to that of a holder of the
funds under a contract with its customer under which the bank
becomes the owner of the funds and becomes a borrower from or
debtor of the account holder. Inasmuch as BNS remained the holder of
the funds, it had not changed its position. Similarly, BMP, to the extent
that funds being claimed were still credited to its account, had not
suffered a change of position.
In sum, then, the Global decision offers a clear rule for permitting
recovery in some instances of moneys paid by a drawee over a forged
instrument. Recovery is permitted in circumstances where the Simms
test is applicable and, more particularly, where the recipient of the
funds is neither a holder in due course (thereby attracting protection
under s. 128) nor has engaged in detrimental reliance of the type that
would support a change of position defence. As Deschamps J. noted,
28. Supra, footnote 1, at para. 52.
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however, the circumstances in which moneys mistakenly paid by a
drawee bank on a forged cheque are recoverable are very likely to be
rare. As she observed: "It is worth noting that cases in which a person
who is not a party to the fraud has neither given consideration nor
changed its position may be rare."29 Rare though such cases might be,
the right to recover is now a clearly recognized feature of Canadian
restitutionary law.
An important point that is at least implicit in the holding in Global
relates to the relationship between the collecting back and its
customer, the payee or endorsee. If the customer is not a holder in due
course and has not suffered a change of position, a collecting bank
which has transferred the funds to its customer is entitled to recovery
of the funds on the basis of Global from its customer. Further, it is
apparent that the collecting bank is entitled to debit its customer's
account in such circumstances. These propositions are necessarily
entailed in the holding in Global that BNS was entitled in these
circumstances to restrain the moneys in the Global accounts and
return them to RBC. They are critical to the holding that BNS did not
suffer a detrimental change of position.
Two further points of interest may be noted. First, although no
reference is made by Deschamps J. to American experience, it is of
interest- some might consider it reassuring - that the rule adopted
by the Supreme Court in Global mirrors the equivalent rule in the
American Uniform Commercial Code.30 ucc 3-418, which deals with
the recovery of a mistaken payment by the drawee on a forged cheque,
provides that remedies "may not be asserted against a person who
took the instrument in good faith and for value or who in good faith
changed position in reliance on the payment". M
Further, it is of some interest that there is now some distance
between Canadian law and the controversial English decision in
National Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd.32
In that case, Kerr J. allowed a claim by a drawee bank against the
payee of the forged cheque, notwithstanding the fact that the payee
had given consideration for the cheque. Kerr J. defended this result
on the basis that the doctrine of Price v. Neal (denying relief) was
applicable only to endorsees, rather than payees, and on the basis,
perhaps, that Price v. Nealwas a case in which the plaintiffdrawee had
conducted himself in such a way as to encourage the holder to assume
29. Ibid., at para. 65.
30. American Law institute, Uniform Commercial Code, Official Text (St. Paul,
Thomson/West Publishing, 2007).
31. Ibid., § 3-418(c) (amended 2002).
32. [1975] 1 Q.B. 654.
[Vol. 48
Commentaries 89
that the drawee believed the signature to be genuine. For Kerr J., no
similar estoppel was raised by the conduct of the drawee in the
National Westminster case. We need not linger over the criticisms that
can be made of a rule that distinguishes between claims against payees
as against those brought against endorsees. 33 The important point for
present purposes is that under the Global doctrine, the defendant in
National Westminster, presumably, would be able to successfully
raise a change of position defence.
4. Canadian Restitutionary Law and the Role of the
Unjust Enrichment Principle
Although the analysis in Global of the basic mistaken payments
rule and its application to the context of forged cheques represent
valuable contributions to the clarification and evolution of the
Canadian law of restitution, perhaps the most important
contribution of the decision in Global is its clarification of the
relationship between the unjust enrichment principle and garden-
variety restitution claims, such as those for the recovery of mistaken
payments. This point is of enormous practical significance for the
practising profession and the judiciary. The rather traditional
position taken on this point by the Supreme Court in Global will
attract controversy among admirers of the late Oxford Regis
Professor of Civil Law, Peter Birks. In order to demonstrate the
significance of Global on this issue, it is necessary to portray, if only
briefly, certain controversies concerning the scope and structure of
the law of restitution and its relationship to the underlying principle
against unjust enrichment.
The basic idea that "restitution" could usefully be recognized as a
third branch of the private law of obligations, in addition to contract
and tort, was the invention of the American Law Institute and formed
the conceptual framework for the Restatement of Restitution,
34
published in 1937. Although the Restatement of Restitution, like the
companion volumes on contract and tort, were essentially
restatements of existing law, it was nonetheless a work of
remarkable innovation. The underlying idea was that large bodies
of existing common law and equity doctrine, hitherto neglected by the
authors of treatises on private law, could be brought together and
restated as a subject or branch of the law unified by an underlying
principle against unjust enrichment. That principle was articulated in
33. See Geva, supra, footnote 21, at pp. 308-13.
34. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi-Contracts
and Constructive Trusts (Philadelphia, American Law Institute Publishers, 1937).
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s. 1 of the Restatement in the now familiar form: "A person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other."
' 35
The common law doctrines restated in the Restatement of
Restitution, often referred to previously as the law of quasi-
contracts, include the recovery of moneys paid by mistake, under
compulsion, under ineffective transactions and more generally, the
recovery of benefits conferred in these and under various other
circumstances. The equitable materials include various doctrines
associated with the granting of constructive trust relief and a variety
of other equitable remedies. Thus, for example, the law of fiduciary
obligation plays a central role in the Restatement's treatment of the
newly organized and restated law of restitution. The basic idea of the
tripartite division of the law into contract, tort and restitution was
that, if one internalizes the three paradigms of contract (the
enforcement of promises), tort (compensation for injuries caused
by wrongful conduct), and restitution (recovery of benefits unjustly
retained), one will have in one's head a conceptual framework around
which one can organize, and hopefully remember, the general
principles and at least some of the details of virtually all of the private
law of obligations.
At the risk of belabouring the point, it will be obvious that the law
of restitution existed for years- indeed hundreds of years - prior to
the publication of the Restatement in 1937. The Restatement merely
reorganized the doctrine and restated it in a more convenient form.
The success of such an exercise, of course, would be measured by the
extent to which the profession in the United States and elsewhere
found the conceptual framework to be a useable and helpful one. The
new subject enjoyed success of this kind in the United States. A new
version of the Restatement is currently in progress. 36 Much later in the
twentieth century, lengthy treatises on restitution, covering more or
less the same ground as that covered in the Restatement, appeared
first in England,37 then in Canada,3 8 Australia3 9 and New Zealand.4 °
35. Ibid., at p. 16.
36. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment (Tentative Draft No. 1) (Philadelphia, American Law Institute
Publishers, 2001) and subsequent tentative drafts. This work is nearing its
completion.
37. R. Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1966),
now, as of 2007, in its 7th edition.
38. P.D. Maddaugh and J.D. McCamus, The Law of Restitution (Aurora, Canada
Law Book Inc., 1990), now in its 2nd edition and subsequent looseleaf edition.




It would not be necessary, of course, for an exercise in restatement
of this kind to receive ajudicial imprimatur. Thus, there is no leading
case one can identify in which an English court gave its blessing to the
early 19th century recognition of contracts as a subject by the writers
of textbooks on that new subject or of the recognition in the late 19th
century of torts as a second branch of the law of obligations by the
writers of texts on that new subject. It is therefore an interesting
feature of the Canadian law of restitution that, among
Commonwealth courts, the Supreme Court of Canada has led the
way in explicitly adopting the unjust enrichment model as the
underlying principle of the Canadian common law of restitution.4 1 In
1954, the Supreme Court of Canada placed reliance on the unjust
enrichment principle as an explanation for the granting of relief in a
quasi-contract case, Deglman i,. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada.42
More than two decades later, the Supreme Court articulated the
unjust enrichment principle as the principle underlying the law
relating to constructive trusts in Pettkus v. Becker.43 The Pettkus
decision was a much more controversial one as it involved the
recognition of a new type of restitutionary claim in the context of
matrimonial property disputes, thereby overruling relatively recent
Supreme Court of Canada authority to the contrary effect.
4 4
In Pettkus, Dickson J. famously restated the unjust enrichment
principle in his own words, in his assertion that "there are three
requirements to be satisfied before an unjust enrichment can be said
to exist: an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation and an absence
of any juristic reason for the enrichment". 5 It remains unclear why
Dickson J. was moved to articulate the principle in this form. It is
beyond doubt, however, that he was engaged in articulating the
principle which he believed to underlie an existing body of doctrine
rather than, for example, offering a basis on which all prior
restitutionary doctrine would be considered to be overruled. At the
same time, it was abundantly clear that Dickson J. was of the view
that the underlying unjust enrichment principle could provide a basis
for extending or modifying existing doctrine. No better evidence of
this is needed than the holding in Pettkus itself. Moreover, when the
test for unjust enrichment is employed for this purpose, it has the
40. R.B. Grantham and C.E.F. Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000).
41. See, generally, Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 10, ch. 2.
42. [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785, [1954] S.C.R. 725.
43. Pettkus v. Becker (1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834.
44. Murdoch v. Murdoch (1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423.
45. Supra, footnote 43, at pp. 273-74.
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appearance offunctioning essentially as a cause of action and it is now
Canadian practice to plead it as such.4 6 Indeed, the current and
unique Canadian practice is to plead restitutionary claims twice, once
in terms of the existing law - such as the rules relating to the recovery
of mistaken payments, or of benefits extracted by duress, or to strip
fiduciaries of their ill-gotten gains, and so on - and a second time in
terms of the Pettkus tripartite formula.47
In England, although the Restatement's concept of the nature and
scope of the law of restitution was essentially adopted by Goff and
Jones in their pioneering treatise48 and by the authors of subsequent
treatises49 on English restitutionary law, one prominent English
scholar, Professor Peter Birks, rejected the Restatement model and
developed his own set of conceptual categories and new and more
restrictive meanings for existing terminology such as "restitution"
and "unjust enrichment". As well, he developed a new terminological
vocabulary to identify the new categories and sub-categories of the
subject or, rather, subjects, which he considered to be constituted by
the terrain covered by the Restatement model. The Birksian model is
highly complex. Indeed, in my view at least, its complexity is one of its
major deficiencies. Moreover, Birks's views changed over time -
46. Although it is Canadian practice that a simple pleading in unjust enrichment is
acceptable (indeed, prudent) in a restitution case, the result of its successful
application, as in Pettkus itself, is not so easily characterized as a simple
application of an unjust enrichment "cause of action". The holding in the case is
that one who holds exclusive title to property created through joint effort with a
spouse or equivalent is obliged, upon dissolution of their relationship, to share
the value thus created. This appears to be, surely, a different kind of claim than,
say a claim for moneys paid under a mistake or pursuant to an ineffective
contract or under duress or the recovery of the ill-gotten gains of a fiduciary or of
benefits conferred in an emergency. The newly recognized matrimonial property
claim may be of the genus unjust enrichment but is surely a different species than
these other types of restitutionary claims. The elements of the restitutionary claim
available in the context of dissolution of marriage and similar relationships are
explored in J.D. McCamus, "Restitution on Dissolution of Marital and Other
Intimate Relationships: Constructive Trust or Quantum Meruit?" in J. Neyers,
M. Mclnnes and S. Pitel, eds., Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Hart
Publishing Co., 2004), ch. 14.
47. Although the pleader cannot be faulted for this exercise in redundancy - a
prudent pleader wishes to ensure that all possible bases are covered - the
existence of the practice is evidence of the confusion concerning the relationship
between the existing rules and the underlying unjust enrichment principle that has
emerged in the wake of Pettkus, supra, footnote 43, and Garland, supra, footnote
3.
48. Supra, footnote 37.
49. See, e.g., A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 2nd ed. (London, Butterworths,




thereby adding further complexity - with the result that a full and
accurate portrayal of his views concerning the structure of
restitutionary law cannot be accomplished in a short compass. For
present purposes, however, a brief portrayal of the main themes of his
most recent work should suffice.
First, Birks has long been of the view that "restitution" is an
inappropriate name for the subject and that it should more properly
be called "unjust enrichment". Second, in his first major work on
restitution, 51 Birks drew a distinction between two classes of
restitutionary claims. The first was constituted by cases involving
the recovery of benefits transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant,
which he called "subtraction" cases. The second category were claims
involving "restitution for wrongs", the latter category including, for
example, claims for restitution for breach of fiduciary duty. The
defining characteristic of cases in this second category, in his view,
was that benefits could be recovered by the plaintiff, whether or not
the benefit unjustly acquired had been transferred by the plaintiff to
the defendant. Birks was of the opinion that a striking difference
between the "subtraction" cases and the "restitution for wrongs"
cases was that cases in the former category constituted "autonomous
unjust enrichment" in the sense that the unjust enrichment principle
was the exclusive source of liability. In cases of restitution for wrongs,
on the other hand, unjust enrichment provided a remedy for a wrong
defined by some other category of law such as tort or fiduciary
obligation (equity). Autonomous unjust enrichment is, in some sense,
primary, whereas restitution for wrongs is "parasitic" and, in some
sense, secondary to another field of law.
52
50. P.B.H. Birks, "Misnomer" in W.R. Cornish et al., eds., Restitution.. Past, Present
and Future (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), ch. 1. For the suggestion, inter alia,
that this terminological change is unnecessary and will serve to confuse the
profession, see A. Tettenborn, "Misnomer - a Reponse to Professor Birks" in
W.R. Cornish et al., ibid., p. 31; A. Burrows, "Quadrating Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment: A Matter of Principle?", [2000] Rest. L. Rev. 257. For a more
admiring account, see M. Mclnnes, "Misnomer: A Classic", [2004] Rest. L. Rev.
79.
51. P.B.H. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1985).
52. A critique of this "parasitic" theory of restitution for wrongs is beyond the scope
of this article. Suffice it to say here that, in my view, this distinction between
primary and secondary liability is not useful. The rules imposing restitutionary
liability for breach of fiduciary liability, for example, are clearly primary in
nature. See, "The Nature of Waiver of Tort" in J. Beatson, The Use and Abuse of
Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 206 et seq. and D.
Friedmann, "Restitution for Wrongs: the Basis for Liability" in W. Cornish et
al., eds., supra, footnote 50, ch. 9.
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In his earlier work,53 Birks had referred to both of these two
categories as "unjust enrichment". In his later work,54 however, he
came to the view that the Restatement scheme was incoherent in that
these two categories were actually separate branches of the law and
that the term unjust enrichment should be exclusively reserved for the
subtraction category. 55 Indeed, it was his view that the subtraction
category should be very narrowly conceived and would include only
cases of benefits conferred by mistake, under duress and by means of
ineffective transactions. These, in his view, were true cases of "unjust
enrichment". In addition to "unjust enrichment" (hard core) and
restitution for wrongs, then, some excluded elements of traditional
restitution were hived off into a category of so-called "other" claims.
Finally, in his latest work,5 6 Birks offered his most radical
proposal. He urged that "unjust enrichment", as narrowly conceived
by him, was the subject of unsatisfactory doctrine in English law. It
was, in his view, unfortunate that English law required a plaintiff to
identify a reason why the plaintiff should be entitled to relief such as
the fact that the benefit was conferred by mistake, under duress, or by
way of an unenforceable contract - he referred to these as "unjust
factors". Rather, it was his view that the civilian systems had a much
better idea - he expressed a preference, in fact, for the German
civilian model - in requiring merely that the plaintiff establish an
"absence of basis" for the transfer of value from the plaintiff to the
defendant. In short, Birks proposed that the existing common law be
rejected and replaced by a principle drawn from civilian
jurisprudence with which he had considerable familiarity.57
For restitution scholars, Birks's works are a source of fascination.
Even those of us who find the work essentially unhelpful concede the
53. Supra, footnote 51.
54. P.B.H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2004).
55. For a defence, at the level of high theory, of the more traditional view that the
scope of restitution is most usefully considered to include both forms of "benefit-
based" liability, i.e. both subtraction cases and restitution for wrongs, see K.
Barker, "Understanding the Unjust Enrichment Principle in Private Law: A
Study of the Concept and its Reasons" in J. Neyers, M. Mclnnes and S. Pitel,
eds., Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Hart Pub. Co. 2004), ch. 5.
56. Supra, footnote 54.
57. In defence of the traditional common law method of requiring the plaintiff to
explain why he or she is entitled to recover (in terms such as "mistake" or
"duress" etc., that a common lawyer and, indeed, a lay person are likely to
understand), see K. Barker, "Responsibility for Gain: Unjust Factors or Absence
of Legal Ground? Starting Points in Unjust Enrichment Law" in C. Rickett and
R. Grantham, eds., Structure and Justification in Private Law' (Oxford, Hart Pub.
Co., 2008), ch. 4.
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ingenuity and rigor of his analysis. Nonetheless, it can fairly be said
that his work has not become a dominant influence in the mainstream
of restitution scholarship and jurisprudence. The text books on
restitution tend to cover the same ground covered by the Restatement
of Restitution. Scholars and judges often use the terms restitution and
unjust enrichment interchangeably to refer to the entire field covered
by the Restatement. English courts, apparently unaware of the
superiority of the German model, doggedly persist in applying the
existing English law (sometimes with appropriate modifications, of
course) in restitution cases. Predicting the future course of common
law doctrine in any jurisdiction is, of course, a chancy business. It
does seem likely, however, that the English courts will continue along
the current path of applying the existing common law. So too, one
may reasonably anticipate, will the courts in other common law
jurisdictions such as Australia and New Zealand. There is simply not
a chance, I would guess, that the Birksian model will take root in
American jurisprudence. Birks's ideas do have a strong following,
however, among a group of scholars- often referred to as Birks-ites
- many of whom are former graduate students of his, who write
about restitutionary topics employing Birksian terminology and
categories.
What on earth, the patient reader may well ask, does any of this
have to do with the Canadian common law of restitution? A central
question for the Canadian law of restitution pertains to the
relationship between the unjust enrichment principle and the
existing rules relating to restitutionary liability. My own view,
58
admittedly rather traditional in nature, is that the unjust enrichment
principle provides a theoretical or conceptual foundation for the
existing law of restitution and may, in appropriate cases, provide a
basis forjudicial extension or modification of prior law. The principle
provides a basis for supplementing or overruling prior doctrine, but it
does not demolish all existing law. Canadian Birks-ites, however,
appear to be attracted by the idea that the unjust enrichment principle
has completely overruled and replaced all prior Canadian law and
provides the exclusive basis for reasoning in restitutionary cases.
Support for this view appears to be drawn from two sources. First, the
careful reader will have noticed the similarity between the Birksian
idea of adopting the civilian principle of "absence of basis" and the
version of the unjust enrichment principle articulated by Dickson J. in
Pettkus, which speaks of "absence ofjuristic reason". This similarity,
when coupled with the reasoning of Iacobucci J. in the recent decision
58. Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 10, ch. 3.
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in Garland v. Consumers Gas CO., 5 9 provides an opening for the
argument that the Supreme Court of Canada has - unwittingly, we
might interject - adopted the Birksian concept of replacing the
existing common law jurisprudence with the civilian doctrine of
"absence of basis" or something rather similar thereto. 60
In Garland, it may be recalled, Iacobucci J. developed an
innovative and unprecedented statement of the juristic reason
analysis. Briefly stated, lacobucci J. suggested that, as Dickson J.
had done in Pettkus, when applying the unjust enrichment principle,
the plaintiff should be required to establish a benefit, detriment and
an absence of juristic reason for the transfer. To establish the latter
point, however, lacobucci J. further suggested that the plaintiff
should be required to disprove the existence of the various possible
reasons that the defendant might wish to rely upon for justifying the
transfer. After proving this negative proposition, 61 the burden would
then shift to the defendant to establish that either for reasons of
"public policy" or on the basis of "reasonable expectations" of some
kind, the defendant should be entitled to retain the benefit. Canadian
Birks-ites appear to be of the view that in articulating this analysis,
lacobucci J. intended to overrule all prior Canadian restitutionary
doctrine (or some as yet identified subset of restitutionary law) and
replace it with his new absence ofjuristic reason analysis. As they are
inclined to say, the Canadian law of restitution has been
"Garlandized" and has adopted the Birksian/civilian notion of
59. Supra, footnote 3.
60. Another apparently unintentional similarly between the Penkus formula and the
eventual Birksian scheme is Dickson J.'s use of the term "detriment", which can
be interpreted strictly to exclude cases, such as some cases of breach of fiduciary
duty where the fiduciary profits without a corresponding "detriment" or
"expense" to the plaintiff. Again we can be certain that Dickson J. did not
intend to casually overrule prior doctrine allowing restitionary recovery under
established doctrines - such as the law of fiduciary obligation - where no
"detriment" or "expense" has occurred. Nor, it seems clear, did Dickson J. have
in mind a radical reconstructuring of the entire field of restitution such as that
ultimately envisaged by Birks.
61. Although lacobucci J. conceded the difficulty inherent in requiring the plaintiff to
prove a negative proposition, he attempted to cure this difficulty by suggesting
that the list of juristic reasons could be confined, for the moment at least, to a
requirement that the plaintiff establish an absence of contract, disposition of law,
donative intent or other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations.
This is quite a handful for plaintiffs counsel, imposing a burden to prove a
negative proposition of quite uncertain amplitude. It is therefore not self-evident
that this list meets the objection that the burden should not be on the plaintiff to
disprove all the elements of a rather vague list of the arguments that might
otherwise be available to the defendant.
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"absence of basis" or some variant thereof as the governing principle
- indeed, the rule to be applied - in all restitution claims.
Peter Maddaugh and I have elsewhere suggested that such views
constitute a misreading of the Garlanddecision. 62 There are a number
of reasons for our view that it was not the intention of lacobucci J. in
Garland to overrule all prior restitutionary law and replace it with his
new version of the unjust enrichment principle. First, so radical a
proposition as this is not likely to have been intended by a court that
subscribes to the view that changes in the law should be incremental in
nature. 63 Replacing the very large and variegated body of
restitutionary doctrine with a single rule is a sufficiently startling
proposition that one would expect the court to communicate that this
dramatic change was intended. No such suggestion is made by
lacobucci J. in his opinion. Similarly, the thought that all prior
common law on restitution was to be replaced by a civilian concept of
"absence of basis" in the form of lacobucci J.'s version of the
"absence of juristic reason" concept is also so dramatic a reform of
prior law that one would expect the court to communicate that a
revolutionary change of this kind was intended. No statement to this
effect is made in lacobucci J.'s opinion.
Moreover, if one reviews lacobucci J.'s opinion carefully, it
appears evident that the view he expresses with respect to the role of
the unjust enrichment is the traditional one - i.e., that the unjust
enrichment analysis will fill in gaps or supplement or modify existing
doctrine, but not simply replace it. The clearest signal to this effect is
that lacobucci J. indicated that he was merely elaborating on the
general approach to unjust enrichment endorsed by McLachlin J. in
Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario.64 In that case, McLachlin J.,
for the Supreme Court of Canada, offered a very traditional view of
the role of the unjust enrichment principle in restitutionary law. The
now Chief Justice indicated that a balance is to be struck between the
existing rules or doctrines of the law and the need for a flexible
instrumentality for modifying prior law so as to allow the law "to
develop in a flexible way as required to meet changing perceptions of
justice" .65 She recommended "a middle path; one which
acknowledges the importance of proceeding on general principles
but seeks to reconcile the principles with the categories of recovery;
one which charts a predictable course without falling into the trap of
62. Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 10, § 3:200:30.
63. See, e.g., London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd., [1992] 3 S.C.R.
299 at pp. 436-37, 97 D.L.R. (4th) 261, per lacobucci J.
64. (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 762.
65. Ibid., at p. 155.
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excessive formalism". 6 6 As McLachlin C.J.C.'s reasons in Peel
illustrate, the proper approach to the analysis of a restitutionary
problem is to start with the existing law and, if it is considered to be
unsatisfactory for some reason, one may rely on the basic underlying
unjust enrichment principle to fill in gaps in the law or modify the
traditional doctrine.
Further, the fact that lacobucci J. referred to the unjust enrichment
analysis as being "relatively new to Canadian jurisprudence" 67 and
expressed his intention as being one of providing clear guidance in the
application of the test to trial judges, strongly suggests that he was not
intending to hand trial judges a blank slate by wiping out all prior law
and replacing it with his new juristic reason analysis. It seems
apparent that his analysis was intended to apply where resort is to be
made to the newly recognized underlying principle.
At the same time, however, it must be conceded that the reasoning
oflacobucci J. in Garlanddoes not plainly and explicitly state that it is
intended merely to supplement, rather than supplant, all prior
restitutionary law. Accordingly, the reasoning in this case has
provided an opening for Canadian Birks-ites to insist that this
dramatic and revolutionary change has occurred. Canadian law has
been "Garlandized", in their view, and all pre-Garland authority can
be simply ignored. The Canadian common law, they insist, must now
be reinvented and rewritten on the basis of a civilian rule with which
few, if any, common lawyers have more than passing familiarity.
68
It is not entirely clear what the views of Canadian Birks-ites would
be with respect to the scope of their favoured "Garlandization" of
Canadian restitutionary law. It might be their view that it would
apply to all of the traditional law of restitution - that is, roughly
speaking, to the materials covered in the table of contents of the
Restatement of Restitution and the mainstream treatises. Perhaps a
more likely view is that it would apply only to what has been referred
to above in Birksian terminology as the "subtraction" cases or,
indeed, it may be their view that it would apply only to the hard core of
subtraction cases identified by Professor Birks in his last work as
66. Ibid., at p. 153.
67. Supra, footnote 3, at p. 401.
68. Lack of familiarity is far from the only problem with the proposed Birksian/
Garlandization of the common law. The inter-connectedness of legal rules makes
the importing of rules from one system into another - the problem of so-called
"legal transplants"- a hazardous exercise. For brief discussion of the difficulties
of moving "absence of legal basis" into the common law for this reason by a
comparatavist, see T. Krebs, in "Review Article, The New Birksian Approach to
Unjust Enrichment", [2004] Rest. L. Rev. 260 at pp. 273-76.
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constituting the true cases of unjust enrichment. All Birks-ites would
agree, however, that the Birksian analysis would apply to a case
involving the recovery of a mistaken payment. For Birks, this is the
central illustration of the hard core of true unjust enrichment cases.
Accordingly, we may assume that a Canadian Birks-ite would take
the view that when analyzing a mistaken payments case, one should
simply apply the Garlandized version of the benefit/detriment/
juristic reason test first articulated in Pettkus, then refined in Garland,
and simply ignore all prior doctrine or case law.
When we turn to examine the reasoning in Global, however, it is
striking that no such analysis is offered. Indeed, Deschamps J. applies
the traditional model of analysis, embraced by McLachlin J. in the
Peel case, and begins with an examination of the existing law. Using
the traditional analytical methods of the common law in terms of
examining the cases, identifying their true rationales, considering
various policy considerations related to the proper interpretation of
those precedents, Deschamps J. offers an interpretation of the law of
mistaken payments, which represents, as suggested earlier, an
important and valuable restatement of the law of mistake. The
remedy is said to be "restitution" rather than one of "unjust
enrichment". No reference is made to the juristic reason analysis in
Garland. No mention is made of the "absence of basis" reasoning that
one might draw from the civil law. The reasoning is, in short, an
exemplar of the kind of approach one would expect from a common
law appellate court dealing with a difficult problem and reasoning
through to a solution on the basis of an analysis of prior authorities.
The analysis in Global should be very reassuring to lawyers and
judges confronting the professional tasks of preparing opinions and
arguments, giving advice to clients and writing judgments. A true
Garlandization of all or some subset of Canadian restitutionary law
would simply plunge the profession into a deepening spiral of
uncertainty and confusion about the content of the law of restitution.
Jettisoning the existing law and replacing it with the rather vague
analysis of juristic reasons, policy considerations and reasonable
expectations articulated in Garland is a recipe for enormous
instability and unpredictability in restitutionary doctrine.
Although such an adventure is no doubt attractive to some
academics, I certainly do not find it attractive. I very much doubt
that members of the profession do so either. Accordingly, the
reasoning in Global is a welcome reassurance that the reasoning in
restitution cases will continue, as it has done for a very long time, to
rest upon an interesting blend of precedent and principle, as, indeed,
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is the case in other branches of private law. To be sure, the need to
resort to the general principle may play a larger role in restitution to
the extent that it may be a less well developed or modernized branch of
the law than contract and tort. But the relationship between principle
and precedent in restitution is not different in kind, I would suggest,
then their interactions in these other two branches of the law.
5. Conclusion
In summary, it is my view that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Global case represents a very valuable contribution to
the development of Canadian restitutionary law. First, by clarifying
the status in Canadian law of Goff J.'s, as he then was, elegant
restatement of the mistaken payments rule in Barclay's Bank, the
Supreme Court has cleared away the doctrinal debris created by the
unduly complex and incoherent traditional version of the mistaken
payments doctrine. In brief, the new rule is that mistaken payments
are recoverable if the mistake caused the payment unless (i) the
defendant can show a payer intention that the payee keep the money
in any event or regardless of the possibility of error, or (ii) the giving of
consideration by the payee for the payment in question, or (iii) the
payee is able to establish a valid change of position defence.
Second, the court has offered a clear pronouncement on the
contentious question of the right of a drawee bank to recover moneys
mistakenly paid out on a forged cheque. Such a claim will enjoy
success unless the recipient has either acquired the status of a holder in
due course or is entitled to establish a valid change of position
defence. The rule is elegant, based on clear reasoning, consistent with
the American rule on point and has the advantage of providing a
result on the Globalfacts that accords with one's intuitive sense of the
fair result.
The third and perhaps most important point made by the Global
decision relates to the relationship between the unjust enrichment
principle and existing restitutionary doctrine. The central question
on this point is whether the general principle recognized in Pettkus
and refashioned in Garland is intended to either supplant all prior
restitutionary law or, more modestly, to provide a basis for
supplementing and modifying the existing doctrines of the law of
restitution. Consistently with the views expressed by the current
Chief Justice in Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario and, in my
view at least, by lacobucci J. in the Garlandcase itself, the reasoning in
Global illustrates the proposition that, when one analyzes a
[Vol. 48
Commentaries 101
restitution problem, one should adopt, as one's first port of call, an
examination of the existing law on point. The unjust enrichment
analysis will provide, in an appropriate case, a basis for filling in gaps
in the existing law or modifying traditional doctrines which appear to
be inconsistent with the unjust enrichment principle. Although this
proposition is, in my view, quite unremarkable and completely
consistent with the common law method applicable throughout the
private law of obligations in common law Canada and in other
common lawjurisdictions, Canadian Birks-ites will be disappointed,
perhaps even dismayed, by the Global decision. For them, it may
appear as a rejection of the proposition that the Garland reasoning is
properly interpreted as providing the basis for turning Canadian
restitutionary common law into an isolated common law laboratory
for experimentation with Professor Birks' suggestion that the existing
common law of restitution or, rather, unjust enrichment (perhaps as
most recently narrowly conceived by him) ought to be replaced by a
doctrine based on the civilian doctrine of "absence of basis". For non-
Birks-ites, however, the Global decision will be received as a welcome
signal that the radical uncertainty and confusion that would be
introduced into Canadian restitutionary law by such an experiment is
not what is intended by the Supreme Court of Canada. The common
law branch of the Canadian legal profession may draw a long breath
and breathe a heavy sigh of relief.
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